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J. Randy Beck 
Mark D. Brad bury 
At the request of the Georgia Supreme Court, two of the authors 
recently conducted research concerning public trust and confidence 
in the Georgia court system. Questions were modeled on a national 
survey conducted in 1999 for the National Center for State Courts. 1 
Among the more striking findings in both the Georgia and national 
surveys were those disclosing the impact of racial identity-both the 
race of those responding to the survey and the race of groups 
identified in particular questions-on public views of the judicial 
system. Put simply, there is a perception among many Georgians 
that the court system treats minorities worse than whites. 
 
 
 
 
 
• George W. Dougherty is Director of the MPA Program and Assistant Professor of Public 
Administration and Political Science at Piedmont College. He was the primary investigator 
for the Georgia Public Trust and Confidence Survey, which was commissioned by the Georgia 
Supreme Court and performed under the auspices of the Carl Vinson Institute of 
Government. 
•• J. Randy Beck is an Associate Professor at the University of Georgia School of Law. 
••• Mark D. Bradbury is a Research Coordinator with the Vinson Institute and a candidate 
for the Doctorate in Public Administration at the University of Georgia. He will be joining 
the Masters of Public Administration faculty at Binghamton University in the Fall of 2003. 
I See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, How THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999 
NATIONAL SURVEY (1999), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_Amt 
PTC_FublicViewCrtsPub.pdf Oast visited Feb. 11, 2003) [hereinafter NATIONAL SURVEY]. 
 
1021 
  
 
While judges are shielded in some respects from the political 
process, they are rightly concerned with maintaining public 
confidence in the courts. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor of the 
United States Supreme Court has said that, "[i]n the last analysis, 
it is the public we serve, and we do care what the public thinks of 
us."2 Public confidence plays a significant role in the ability of 
courts to perform their function effectively. It has been noted that 
"courts must rely for enforcement of their decisions on retaining 
sufficient respect from individual citizens so that the vast majority 
will comply voluntarily."3 
This Essay considers implications of the Georgia findings for a 
line of United States Supreme Court decisions designed to prevent 
racial discrimination by trial lawyers in the selection of trial juries. 
In Batson v. Kentucky,4 the Supreme Court concluded that a 
government lawyer prosecuting an African-American criminal 
defendant violates the Equal Protection Clause  if  the  prosecutor 
uses peremptory challenges for the purpose of excluding African- 
Americans from the jury. 5 The Batson principle has been extended 
in a series of subsequent decisions, so that the prohibition on 
racially discriminatory peremptory challenges now extends  to  all 
trial attorneys, regardless of the nature of the case or the identity 
of the client.6 
The importance of public confidence in the court system was a 
foundational assumption underlying the Batson line of cases.7 Thus, 
it should come as no surprise that the findings of the Georgia Public 
Trust and Confidence survey bear in a number of ways on issues 
raised by Batson and its progeny.  This Essay will discuss some of 
 
 
 
2 Sandra Day O'Connor, Address to the National Conference on Public Trust and 
Confidence in the Justice System, quoted in James Podgers, Confidence Game, AB.A. J., July 
1999, at 86. 
3   Susan M. Olson & David A. Huth, Explaining Public Attitudes Toward Local Courts, 
20 JUST. SYS. J. 41, 42 (1998). 
4    476 U.S. 79 (1986). . 
5   Id. at 136. 
8    Seegenerally Georgia v. McCollum, 505U.S. 42 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete 
Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
7 Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (discriminating racially in jury selection "damages both the 
fact and the perception" that juries can guard against wrongful exercise of state power); 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (stating that "(s]election procedures that purposefully exclude black 
persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice."). 
  
   
 
the survey's findings and trace out various respects in which the 
data speaks to the rationale, the implications, and the effectiveness 
of Batson. 
 
I. BATSON V.KENTUCKY AND ITS PROGENY 
 
The Batson opinion must be understood against the background 
of the United States Supreme Court's earlier decision in Swain v. 
Alabama. 8 In Swain, an African-American defendant was convicted 
of rape and sentenced to death by an all-white jury. 9 While six 
African-Americans were initially part of the jury venire, the 
prosecutor removed all six through the use of peremptory strikes.10 
Surveying the history of peremptory challenges and emphasizing 
their value in securing an impartial jury, the Supreme Court 
concluded that an equal protection claim could not be based on a 
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in a particular  case: 
 
In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and 
the function it serves in a pluralistic society in 
connection with the institution of jury trial, we 
cannot hold that the Constitution requires an 
examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the 
exercise of his challenges in any given case. The 
presumption in any particular case must be that the 
prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a 
fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court. 
The presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor 
therefore subjected to examination by allegations that 
in the case at hand all Negroes were removed from 
the jury or that they were removed because they were 
Negroes. Any other result, we think, would establish a 
rule wholly at odds with the peremptory challenge 
system as we know it.11 
 
 
 
 
 
8   380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
8   Id. at 203. 
10   Id. at 2015. 
11   Id. at 222. 
  
 
The Court did leave open the possibility that an equal protection 
violation could be shown if a prosecutor removed African-Americans 
from juries "in case after case," regardless of the circumstances, so 
that no African-American ever served on a petit jury. 12 But apart 
from such claims based on systematic discriminatory use of jury 
strikes in a broad range of cases, Swain barred the door to equal 
protection arguments premised on use of peremptory challenges. 
In Batson, the Supreme Court overruled this aspect of Swain, 
permitting equal protection claims based upon use of peremptory 
challenges by the prosecutor in a particular case.13 Batson involved 
an African-American criminal defendant convicted by an all-white 
jury. 14 The prosecutor removed four African-Americans from the 
jury venire. 15 The Court noted that removing potential jurors on 
account of race harmed not only the criminal defendant and 
excluded jurors, but also the community's perception of the court 
system since "[s]election procedures that purposefully exclude black 
persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of 
our system of justice. "16 
The Court in Batson established a three-step framework for 
evaluating equal protection claims based on peremptory challenges. 
Initially, based on all relevant circumstances, the defendant must 
establish a prima facie case raising an inference that the prosecutor 
removed veniremen on account of race. 17 The prima facie case might 
be based, for instance, on evidence of a "pattern" of strikes exercised 
against members of a particular race or on the prosecutor's 
comments or questions during voir dire.18   If the defendant 
establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the 
prosecution to present "a neutral explanation for challenging 
black jurors. "19 Finally, the trial court must make a factual 
determination as to whether "the defendant has established 
purposeful discrimination," i.e., whether the race-neutral reason 
offered by the prosecutor was 
 
 
12   Id. at 223. 
18    476 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1986). 
14    Id. at 82-83. 
ta   Id. 
•a  Id. at 87. 
17   Id. at 96. 
18    Id. at 96-97. 
19   Id. at 97-98. 
  
 
the true reason for the challenges, or was merely a pretext  for 
removal of jurors on account of race.20 
Batson involved exclusion of African-Americans from a jury 
trying an African-American defendant.21 In a series of subsequent 
cases, the Supreme Court extended the Batson principle to other 
contexts. In Powers u. Ohio,22 the Court held that a white criminal 
defendant could assert the rights of African-Americans excluded 
from service on a jury. 23 The Court noted that a jury "acts as a vital 
check against the wrongful exercise of power by the State and its 
prosecutors," and that racial discrimination in jury selection 
"damages both the fact and the perception of this guarantee."24 In 
Ed monson u. Leesville Concrete Co.,25 the Court extended the Batson 
rule to peremptory challenges exercised by private attorneys in civil 
cases.26 And in Georgia u. McCollum,27 the Court applied Batson to 
peremptory  challenges exercised  by  a criminal defendant.28 
The Court also has elaborated on Batson's framework for 
evaluating equal protection claims. Hernandez u. New York29 
involved a prosecutor who excused Latino jurors from a trial 
involving a Latino defendant and Latino victims. 30 The prosecutor 
explained that some of the testimony would be offered in Spanish 
and, based upon the uoir dire responses of the two jurors in 
question, he doubted their ability to accept the official translation 
of Spanish-language testimony.31 Since the prosecutor's explanation 
potentially could apply to both Latino and non-Latino jurors, the 
 
 
 
 
20    Id. at 98. 
21   Id. at 82-83. 
22    499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
23   Id. at 410. 
24    Id. at 411. 
500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
28 See generally id. The Court concluded that a private attorney is a "state actor'' when 
exercising peremptory challenges in the context of jury selection. Id. at 619-28. 
27   505 U.S. 42 (1992). 
28 Seegenerally id. The Court has also applied the Batson rule to prohibit jury challenges 
exercised on the basis of the venireperson's gender. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 
(1994). 
29    500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
90   See generally id. 
31   Id. at 356. 
  
 
Court concluded that it satisfied the requirement of race- 
neutrality.32 
On the ultimate factual issue of whether the explanation was 
pretextual, the Court deferred to the trial court's finding that the 
prosecutor had not engaged in intentional discrimination.33 
Significantly, however, Hernandez emphasized that a court 
considering the third step of the Batson inquiry should give 
appropriate weight to any "disparate impact" associated with the 
prosecutor's explanation: 34 
 
If a prosecutor articulates a basis for a peremptory 
challenge that results in the disproportionate exclusion 
of members of a certain race, the trial judge may con· 
sider that fact as evidence that the prosecutor's stated 
reason constitutes a pretext for racial discrimination.35 
 
This focus on the evidentiary value of disparate impact in the 
Batson context was simply a particular application of a principle 
applied more generally in equal protection analysis. The Court had 
previously stated that "an invidious discriminatory purpose may 
often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the 
fact, if it is true, that the [classification] bears more heavily on one 
race than another."96 
The Court returned to the nondiscriminatory explanation 
requirement in Purkett u. Elem,s7 where it reiterated that a 
prosecutor's explanation for a peremptory challenge will be 
deemed race neutral unless it inherently involves racial 
discrimination.98 To satisfy the second step of the Batson inquiry, 
the explanation for a peremptory challenge need not be 
"persuasive, or even plausible." 39 The Court therefore found the 
requirement of race neutrality satisfied where the prosecutor 
explained that a juror was struck 
 
 
 
32    Id. at 357 n.2. 
83   Id. at 360. 
a.c   Id. at 362. 
85   Id. at 363. 
88    Id. 
37    514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam). 
38   Id. at 768. 
39   Id. at 767-68. 
  
 
"because he had long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard."40 
The persuasiveness of the justification only becomes relevant at the 
third stage of the Batson inquiry, at which point "implausible or 
fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be 
pretexts for purposeful discrimination."41 
The Supreme Court considered a Batson claim most recently in 
Miller-El v. Cockrell.42 In that case, a capital defendant introduced 
evidence that the prosecution had excluded 10 of 11 potential 
African-American jurors. In addition, the prosecutors had engaged 
in disparate questioning of African-American panel members during 
voir dire and had invoked a "jury shuffle" procedure when African- 
Americans were seated in the front of the panel. There was also 
evidence that the district attorney's office had a prior history of 
excluding minority jurors. In light of this record, the Supreme 
Court indicated that the. state trial court committed "clear error" 
when it ruled that the defendant had not established a prima facie 
case of discrimination in the jury selection process.49 
 
II. RACE AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE GEORGIA COURTS 
 
The United States Supreme Court's decision seventeen years ago 
in Batson was premised in part on a desire to bolster public 
confidence in the fairness of the court system. One finding that 
clearly emerges from the Georgia Public Trust and Confidence 
survey, however, is that a large segment of the population believes 
minorities, and especially African-Americans, are treated worse 
than others by the court system. Significantly, more than one-third 
of all Georgians see African-Americans and Hispanics as receiving 
worse treatment. The Georgia Public Trust and Confidence survey 
asked three questions concerning treatment by the courts. The 
questions were "How are people like you treated in the courts?," 
"How are African-Americans treated in the courts?," and "How are 
 
 
 
40   Id. at 769. 
41    Id. at 768. 
42   No. 01-7662, 2003 WL 431659 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2003). 
48 Id. at •14.•16. The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the Batson issue was 
sufficiently debatable that a certificate of appealability should have been granted to permit 
appellate review of the denial of federal habeas corpus relief.  Id. at •17. 
  
 
Hispanics treated in the courts?" Results from those questions are 
presented below. 
As Table 1shows, African-Americans and Hispanics were much 
more likely to indicate that people like themselves received 
"somewhat worse" or "far worse" treatment by the courts. While 
only 9.3% of whites indicated worse treatment for people like 
themselves, 39.1% of African-American and 30.1% of Hispanic 
respondents chose those options. These results clearly show that 
race matters in perceptions of the Georgia courts.44 
 
TABLE 1: How Do COURTS TREAT PEOPLE LIKE You? 
 FAR 
BETTER 
TREAT· 
MENT 
SOMEWHAT 
BETTER 
TREAT· 
MENT 
SAME 
TREAT· 
MENT 
SOMEWHAT 
WORSE 
TREAT· 
MENT 
FAR 
WORSE 
TREAT· 
MENT 
African 
American 
(N=212) 
1.9% 15.6% 43.4% 27.8% 11.3% 
Hispanic 
(N=183) 
2.2% 8.2% 59.6% 23.0% 7.1% 
White 
(N=430) 
3.5% 19.1% 68.1% 7.2% 2.1% 
Total 
(N=825) 
2.8% 15.8% 59.9%  16.0% 5.6% 
 
The level of disappointment with treatment by the courts among 
African-American Georgians is more apparent from  the question 
concerning how the courts treat African-Americans. Once again, as 
Table 2 indicates, race matters with over 71% of African-American 
respondents indicating that members of their race receive "some- 
what worse"  or "far worse"  treatment  from the courts and  28.1% 
 
 
 
« All relationships identified as statistically significant were determined using Pearson's 
Chi-square. All are significant at the .10 level or greater. 
In the national survey, nearly half of all respondents believed that African-Americans 
(46.6%) and Hispanics (46.9%) were treated worse than other groups. See NATIONAL SURVEY, 
supra note 1, at 37. Furthermore, over two·thirds of African-Americans feel that people like 
them are treated worse than others.  Id. at 38. 
  
choosing the "far worse" option. Only 36.5% of whites and 40.0% of 
Hispanics indicated that African-Americans receive "somewhat 
worse" or "far worse" treatment by the courts.45 
 
TABLE 2: How Do COURTS TREAT AFRICAN-AMERICANS? 
 FAR 
BETTER 
TREAT- 
MENT 
SOMEWHAT 
BETTER 
TREAT- 
MENT 
SAME 
TREAT- 
MENT 
SOMEWHAT 
WORSE 
TREAT· 
MENT 
FAR 
WORSE 
TREAT- 
MENT 
African 
American 
(N=231) 
1.3% 4.3% 22.9% 43.3% 28.1% 
Hispanic 
(N=185) 
5.9% 11.9% 42.2% 24.9% 15.1% 
White 
(N=427) 
4.0% 9.6% 49.9% 28.8% 7.7% 
Total 
(N=843) 
3.7% 8.7% 40.8% 31.9% 14.9% 
 
When asked how the courts treat Hispanics (Table 3), African- 
American and Hispanic respondents were much more likely to 
choose the "somewhat worse" and "far worse" treatment options. 
Interestingly, a larger proportion of African-Americans indicated 
"somewhat worse" or "far worse" treatment for Hispanics than 
Hispanic respondents. 46 Whites were slightly more likely to indicate 
poor treatment of Hispanics than when  asked about the treatment 
of African-Americans. 47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 In the national survey, 68.1% of African-American respondents said that, as a group, 
African-Americans received worse treatment from the courts. Id. at 37. Over 42% of whites 
and Hispanics concurred.   Id. 
48 Among African-Americans, 61.4% indicated "somewhat worse" or"far worse" treatment 
for Hispanics, while the comparable figure for Hispanic respondents was only 57.2%. See 
infra Table 3. 
47 Among white respondents, 49.4% indicated that Hispanics receive "somewhat worse" 
or "far worse" treatment by the courts.  See infra Table 3. 
  
 
 
TABLE 3: How Do COURTS TREAT HISPANICS? 
 FAR 
BETTER 
TREAT- 
MENT 
SOMEWHAT 
BETIER 
TREAT- 
MENT 
SAME 
TREAT- 
MENT 
SOMEWHAT 
WORSE 
TREAT- 
MENT 
FAR 
WORSE 
TREAT- 
MENT 
African 
American 
(N=210) 
1.0% 11.9% 25.7% 38.1% 23.3% 
Hispanic 
(N=l94) 
0.5% 5.2% 37.1% 35.6% 21.6% 
White 
(N=382) 
2.4% 5.2% 42.9% 41.9% 7.5% 
Total 
(N=786) 
1.5% 7.0% 36.9% 39.3% 15.3% 
 
Whatever the effect of Batson has been in Georgia, it has not 
magically convinced the public that race is irrelevant to one's 
experience in the Georgia courts. These results show that there are 
significant differences in how members of different racial and ethnic 
groups perceive treatment in the court system. Given that African- 
Americans make up approximately twenty-nine percent of Georgia's 
population, and the Hispanic population is expected to grow 
significantly, these findings become particularly relevant to the 
Batson decision and the makeup of Georgia trial juries. 
 
III. JURY SERVICE AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE GEORGIA COURTS 
 
While Batson has not produced a general public consensus that 
all races receive equal treatment in the court system, that does not 
necessarily mean the decision has been completely ineffective, or 
that it is somehow fundamentally misguided. By striking at the use 
of racial stereotypes as the basis for peremptory challenges, one 
expected outcome of the Batson decision would be to increase the 
number of minorities serving on petit juries. Such an outcome could 
play a potentially significant role in improving public confidence in 
the court system. Data from the Georgia survey suggests that, in 
certain respects,  those who have served as jurors  tend to have 
  
TABLE 4: How MUCH TRUST Do You HAVE INYOUR COMMUNITY COURTS? 
African 
American 
 
(N=105) 7.2% 
 
greater trust in the court system than other citizens, and this holds 
true when minority jurors are examined. 
The Georgia survey asked respondents how much trust or 
confidence they have in various institutions, including the courts in 
their community. Half of the sample were asked how much 
confidence they have in their community courts, and half were 
asked how much trust they have in their community courts. The 
wording of the question led to noticeable differences in responses. 
Analysis of the data shows that, while service on a jury did not 
significantly increase confidence in the courts, respondents who had 
served on a jury indicated higher levels of trust in their community 
courts.48 
Seventy-nine percent of those who had served as jurors chose 
the "great deal of trust" or "some trust" options when asked about 
the courts in their community. Over 31% of respondents who had 
not served as a juror indicated "little trust" in the courts compared 
to 12.9% of former jurors. These findings become more relevant to 
the Batson issue when one separates the data based on the 
respondents' race. Among the respondents in the Georgia survey, 
38.8% of whites, 27.5% of African-Americans, and 4.3% of 
Hispanics had served as jurors. 49 As shown in Table 4, 
approximately 83% of whites and 64% of African-Americans who 
served on juries indicated a  "great deal  of trust" or "some trust" in 
community courts compared to 77% among whites and 57% 
among African-Americans who had not served as jurors. 
 
 
 
 JURY 
DUTY 
GREAT DEAL 
OF TRUST 
SOME 
TRUST 
LITTLE 
TRUST 
NO TRUST 
 Yes 22.7% 40.9% 1  8.2% 1  8.2% 
No 4.8% 51.8% 36.1 %  
 
 
 
 
48   No significant differences were found between "trust" and "confidence" on this, or any, 
question in the national survey. 
49    Only nine of the 211Hispanic Georgians surveyed indicated prior service as a juror. 
  
 
Hispanic 
(N=174) 
 
Yes 
 
14.3% 
 
71.4% 
 
14.3% 
 
0.0% 
No 10.8% 35.3% 42.5% 11.4% 
White 
 
(N=229) 
Yes 33.3% 50.0% 10.8% 5.9% 
No 20.55 56.7% 15.7% 7.1% 
Total 
 
(N=531) 
Yes 30.2% 48.8% 12.9% 7.9% 
No 13.3% 46.7% 31.1% 8.9% 
 
The survey also asked respondents whether they felt judges were 
fair and honest. Table 5 illustrates that, of those who served on 
juries, 85.2% agreed or strongly agreed that judges are fair and 
honest.  Approximately  76% of respondents who had not served on 
a jury agreed or strongly agreed that judges are fair and honest. 
Ninety percent of whites who had served as jurors indicated that 
judges are fair and honest compared to 83% of non-jurors. For 
African-American respondents, 72.5% of former jurors agreed that 
judges are fair and honest, while 65% of African-Americans with no 
prior jury service agreed or strongly agreed. 
 
 
TABLE 5: JUDGES IN YOUR COMMUNITY COURTS ARE 
FAIR AND HONEST 
 JURY 
DUTY 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
SOMEWHAT 
AGREE 
SOMEWHAT 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
African 
American 
 
(N=225) 
Yes 29.0% 43.5% 21.0% 6.5% 
No 13.5% 51.5% 24.5% 10.4% 
Hispanic 
 
(N=174) 
Yes 25.0% 37.5% 12.5% 25.0% 
No 27.0% 46.6% 19.7% 6.7% 
White 
 
(N=457) 
Yes 37.2% 53.0% 5.5% 4.4% 
No 30.7% 52.2% 10.9% 6.2% 
Total 
 
(N=903) 
Yes 34.1% 51.1% 9.1% 5.7% 
No 25.2% 50.5% 16.7% 7.5% 
  
Another survey item asked Georgians to respond to the 
statement "judges follow public wishes, not the law." Table 6 
indicates that, while 70.4% of respondents who had served as jurors 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, 61% of those 
without prior jury service disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
 
TABLE 6: JUDGES FOLLOW PUBLIC WISHES, NOT THE LAW 
 JURY 
DUTY 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
SOMEWHAT 
AGREE 
SOMEWHAT 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
African 
American 
(N=221) 
Yes 8.1% 22.6% 40.3% 29.0% 
No 15.7% 30.2% 27.7% 26.4% 
Hispanic 
 
(N=183) 
Yes 25.0% 37.5% 12.5% 25.0% 
No 8.6% 30.3% 21.7% 39.4% 
White 
 
(N=442) 
Yes 7.9% 19.8% 36.7% 35.6% 
No 7.2% 27.9% 35.1% 29.8% 
Total 
 
(N=880) 
Yes 8.2% 21.4% 36.2% 34.2% 
No  9.8% 29.2% 29. 1% 31.9% 
 
Perhaps the survey item in the Georgia survey most relevant to 
our purposes here required a response to the statement "most juries 
are not representative of the community." Table 7 shows that only 
46.7% of African-Americans with previous jury service agreed with 
the statement, compared to 66.7% of African-Americans who had 
not served as jurors. White respondents with prior jury service, 
however, were more likely to agree with the statement (57.3%) than 
those without jury service (53.5%). 
 
 
TABLE 7: MOST JURIES ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COMMUNITY. 
 JURY 
DUTY 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
SOMEWHAT 
AGREE 
SOMEWHAT 
DISAGREE 
 STRONGLY 
D  ISAGREE 
African 
American 
Yes 21.7% 25.0% 38.3% 15.0% 
  
 
(N=219) No 22.0% 44.7% 22.6% 1037% 
Hispanic 
 
(N=170) 
Yes 33.3% 22.2% 22.2% 22.2% 
No 14.3% 46.6% 27.3% 11.8% 
White 
 
(N=439) 
Yes 19.7% 37.6% 20.8% 20.2% 
No 13.4% 39.1% 32.2% 15.3% 
Total 
 
(N=880) 
Yes 20.9% 33.7% 25.2% 20.2% 
No 16.4% 42.6% 27.9% 13.1% 
 
Taken together, these results reaffirm that jury service tends to 
improve public perception of the courts. The statistically significant 
differences between African-Americans who have served as jurors 
and those who have not provides evidence to support the Court's 
concern in Batson that excluding African-Americans from juries 
undermines perceptions of fairness in our system of justice. 150 
Participation in the courts as a juror arguably increases trust and 
perceptions of fairness, especially for African-Americans. 151 
 
IV. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BASED ON PERCEIVED 
UNFAIRNESS TO MINORITIES 
 
A recent Georgia case applying Batson highlights the importance 
of the findings of the Georgia survey. In Brown v. State,152  the 
defendant in a voluntary  manslaughter and aggravated assault 
prosecution established a prima facie case under Batson.153 Thus, 
the court asked the prosecutor to explain her reasons for exercising 
a peremptory challenge against  a  particular   African-American 
juror. 154     One reason offered by the prosecutor was that the juror 
 
 
 
 
110  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). 
51  One rival explanation is that the peremptory challenge system or other factors tend 
to lead to selection of juries more favorable toward judges  and courts than the general 
population. 
52   568 S.E.2d 62 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). 
53   Id at 63. 
M  Id. 
  
 
lived in the area where the crime occurred. 55 She also gave a second 
reason, which the court discussed in the following passage: 
 
Also, the prosecutor said that the juror, "when asked 
about the system being prejudiced against one based on 
race, he said, yes, it was. And I said, well, what do you 
base that opinion on? [Answer:] Living in America. So 
he has [sic] a black man, already indicates that he 
believes the system is unfair toward blacks. And in this 
case the defendant is black. That was a great concern to 
the state." The prosecutor went on to state: "And when 
you talk about a person feeling the system is racially 
prejudiced, you're not talking about racially prejudiced 
to a victim, you're talking about racially prejudiced to 
the person who is on trial or against the person who is 
on trial[,] who in this case is a black male, which is the 
same race and gender of the party that we struck." The 
prosecutor stated that a belief that the system was 
unfair to blacks was "particularly relevant when the 
party who is saying the system is prejudiced based on 
race is the same race as the defendant. That's when it 
becomes an issue, your honor."56 
 
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, finding a 
Batson violation. 57 It concluded that the reason offered by the 
prosecutor for the peremptory challenge was not "race neutral."58 
Indeed, the prosecutor identified the juror's race as a factor 
"particularly relevant" to her decision to exercise the peremptory 
challenge.59 
A comparable case from another jurisdiction is Minnesota v. 
McRae.60 There the prosecutor struck the only African-American 
member of the jury  venire after questioning her extensively about 
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her views of the fairness of the judicial system.61 The prosecutor 
sought to justify the strike under Batson on the ground that the 
juror believed the system was unfair to minorities and might 
therefore be biased in favor of the defendant.62 As in Brown, the 
prosecutor referenced the race of the juror as a relevant consider- 
ation.63 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the conviction, 
concluding that the trial court had not properly followed the three- 
step inquiry required by Batson.64 
Cases like Brown and McRae raise the interesting question of 
whether an attorney may exercise a peremptory challenge based on 
a juror's views concerning the courts' treatment of minorities. 
Suppose the prosecutors in these cases had not identified the juror's 
race as a factor relevant to their peremptory challenges. What if 
instead they had purported to exercise challenges purely on the 
ground that the juror believed the system was unfair to African- 
Americans? How should such a case be analyzed under Batson? 
The Georgia survey suggests that, if a prosecutor explained a 
strike on the ground that a juror believed the system was unfair to 
minorities, this reason should be deemed "race neutral" as that term 
is used in the Batson line of cases. As noted above, more than one- 
third of Georgians of all races feel African-Americans and Hispanics 
are treated less favorably by the courts.65 Since this view is held in 
large numbers by people in all major racial groups in the state, one 
cannot conclude that peremptory strikes exercised against jurors 
holding this view would be inherently discriminatory. 
However, as the Court emphasized in Hernandez and Purkett, 
even after the prosecutor offers a race-neutral explanation for a 
peremptory challenge, the trial court may still find a Bat son 
violation if it concludes that the prosecutor's explanation is 
pretextual and that the peremptory challenge was really exercised 
on account of race. One piece of evidence that can weigh in favor of 
a finding of pretext is the fact that the reason offered by the 
prosecutor has a racially disproportionate impact. 
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The Georgia findings suggest that this rationale for a peremptory 
challenge is one that would disproportionately exclude minorities 
from jury service. In cases involving African-American defendants, 
about 36.5% of whites would be excluded using this argument, 
whereas approximately 71% of potential African-American jurors 
could be struck on this ground. For Hispanic defendants, over 57% 
of all minority jurors could be struck. The result would be fewer 
minority jurors in cases with minority defendants.66 Thus, while a 
challenge based upon the courts' perceived unfavorable treatment 
of minorities is formally race-neutral under Batson, the data 
suggests a trial court facing such an argument should be more 
inclined to find this explanation pretextual than other possible 
explanations that would exclude people of all races in equal 
proportions. 
Furthermore, excluding minorities on this formally race-neutral 
ground could further "undermine public confidence in the fairness 
of our system of justice." 67 If observers perceived the state as 
removing any potential jurors concerned about the treatment of 
minorities in the courts, that could further reduce confidence in the 
judicial system. The result could be less trust and diminished 
perceptions of fairness in the courts among minorities in Georgia. 
 
· V. CONCLUSION 
 
The Georgia courts, like other courts in the nation, suffer a crisis 
of public confidence when it comes to treatment of minorities. While 
Batson alone cannot resolve the crisis, the data suggests that the 
Batson principle may play a valuable role in addressing the 
problem. 
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